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INTROducTION
Climate change has increased both marine access to much of the circumpolar Arctic and the migra-tion of fish stocks into northern waters. As fish 
stocks become depleted in southern jurisdictions, Arctic 
fish stocks could become more attractive for illegal, unre-
ported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This situation has 
many parallels with the experiences of IUU fishing in the 
Southern Ocean around the Antarctic. However, unlike 
those in Antarctica, fish and marine mammal stocks in 
the circumpolar Arctic are subject to indigenous and local 
subsistence harvesting, which has priority over commer-
cial harvesting. Arctic fish stocks are also characterized by 
lower growth rates, which increase their vulnerability to the 
impact of IUU fishing. 
In the Canadian Arctic, because of slow fish growth, 
limited seasonal fishing opportunities, and the high cost of 
shipping, extensive ecosystem and economic changes would 
be required to make commercial fisheries feasible. Fisheries 
have been very close to shore throughout the Canadian Arc-
tic. Though attempts have been made to harvest Arctic char 
(Salvelinus alpinus) commercially, this species has been 
harvested primarily for subsistence and recreation. Arc-
tic cisco (Coregonus autumnalis) or Pacific herring (Clu-
pea palasii) are potential commercial fishery targets in the 
Canadian Beaufort Sea, but these harvests would be subject 
to beluga whale feeding requirements.
In this essay, I explore several northern fisheries to 
examine various IUU fishing scenarios for the Arctic: com-
mercial fishing in the Canadian and U.S. Beaufort Sea, the 
offshore halibut fishery adjacent to the Nunavut Territory 
of Canada, and the Irminger Sea redfish fishery in the Rey-
kjanes Ridge of the North Atlantic. I then consider cur-
rent regulatory regimes for IUU fisheries in Antarctica and 
Europe, which provide potential models for Arctic fisheries.
International Framework
Exclusive Economic Zones established under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) indi-
cate the outer boundaries of national fishing rights and man-
agement regimes (United Nations, 1982). The Agreement on 
fish stocks (United Nations, 1995), an implementing agree-
ment under UNCLOS that has been in force since 2001, 
applies to both Exclusive Economic Zones and international 
Illegal, unreported and unregulated Fishing in the circumpolar Arctic
by Magdalena A.K. Muir
waters. It is designed to promote the long-term conserva-
tion and sustainable use of straddling fish species (whose 
geographical range includes Exclusive Economic Zones and 
international waters) and highly migratory fish species in 
international waters. 
Under the Agreement on fish stocks, regional fishery 
management organizations and arrangements are the pre-
ferred mechanisms for fishery management. The Agree-
ment imposes obligations on signatories to cooperate 
through such regional bodies and arrangements, and access 
to fish stocks is limited to cooperating states. States can 
become members of the regional organizations or partici-
pate in regional arrangements. Members and participants 
can enforce their rules against external parties or non-sig-
natories to these agreements, using measures that would 
otherwise be viewed as trade-related sanctions in violation 
of international law (i.e., World Trade Organization, 1994).
Regional fishery management organizations established 
under conventions that affect Arctic fisheries include the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and its 
Fisheries Commission, the North Atlantic Salmon Conser-
vation Organization, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Com-
mission, the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, 
and the Norway-Russian Federation Fisheries Commission 
(Molenaar and Corell, 2009). 
Boundary disputes may complicate the characterization 
of what constitutes an illegal fishery. Different countries 
may impose different regulatory regimes on the same fish 
stocks. For example, Canada has disputed marine bounda-
ries with the United States and Greenland, as Norway does 
with Russia. Such disputes create ambiguity about who has 
legal access to disputed areas and the right to use and man-
age both nonrenewable and renewable resources, including 
fish and marine mammals, in those areas. Norway and Rus-
sia recently ended a 40-year dispute by dividing a disputed 
area in the Barents Sea evenly, thus also resolving juris-
dictional issues over fisheries. That agreement is dated 27 
April 2010, but the technical terms and implementation are 
still to be determined (Anon, 2010).
Canadian and U.S. Beaufort Sea
The United States and Canada have ongoing disputes 
over the ownership and control of the sea floor, surface, 
and water column in the Beaufort Sea (see Ingenfeld, 2010: 
Fig. 1). Canada asserts that the Beaufort Sea boundary is a 
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linear extension of the boundaries on land, while the United 
States asserts that the boundary begins at a 90˚ angle to the 
shoreline. This boundary dispute has historically focused 
on hydrocarbons, but the Arctic Fishery Management Plan 
(Fig. 1) enacted by the United States in 2009 may precipi-
tate a future focus on commercial fishing rights. Given the 
overlap of the areas claimed by the two countries, parties 
legally authorized to fish in the Canadian Beaufort Sea 
would be fishing illegally under U.S. law. 
The recent U.S. Arctic Fishery Management Plan 
(NPFMC, 2009) prohibits the expansion of commercial 
fishing in Arctic federal waters until researchers have 
gathered enough information on fish stocks and the Arc-
tic marine environment to implement sustainable fisheries. 
Arctic cod (Boreogadus saida), saffron cod (Eleginus gra-
cialis), and snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) are identified 
as likely initial target species for commercial fishing in the 
Beaufort Sea. The plan will govern future commercial fish-
ing in federal waters for all fish and shellfish species except 
Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus sp.) and Pacific halibut 
(Hippoglossus stenolepis), which are subject to other con-
trols. However, it will not affect either fisheries for salmon, 
whitefish, and shellfish in Arctic waters near the Alaskan 
shore or subsistence fishing and hunting in the Arctic. 
At this time, no commercial fisheries operate in the Cana-
dian Beaufort Sea, but there are Inuvialuit and Gwich’in 
subsistence fisheries and recreational fisheries. If commer-
cial fishing opportunities arise, the Inuvialuit and Gwich’in 
will be involved. In May 2010, the Standing Committee on 
Fisheries and Oceans of the Canadian Senate recommended 
that the federal government, in cooperation with the Inuvi-
aluit, develop a policy for fishing activity for the Beaufort 
Sea. It also recommended that Canada institute a morato-
rium on commercial fishing similar to the one instituted 
by the United States under the Arctic Fishery Management 
Plan (SSCFO, 2010). The United States and Canada are also 
currently engaged in discussions aimed at resolving out-
standing boundary disputes, which could also resolve IUU 
fishery issues for the Beaufort Sea.
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FIG. 1. The area of the U.S. Arctic Fishery Management Plan (NOAA, 2010). 
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Internal IUU Fishing in Canada
Greenlandic halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides, also 
known as turbot) and shrimp (Pandalus borealis, northern 
or pink shrimp) are fished offshore of Nunavut within Davis 
Strait and Baffin Bay. Greenlandic halibut is found within 
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization’s subarea 0, 
which includes Canadian waters adjacent to the Nunavut 
Territory (Fig. 2). Canada manages these waters in subarea 
0 on the basis of the conservation and catch recommenda-
tions from the scientific council under the Northwest Atlan-
tic Fisheries Convention. The Canadian management plan, 
which is subject to the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
of 1993, includes Inuit participation in and management of 
offshore fisheries (DFO, 2006–08). 
Previously, there were questions about how the halibut 
catch should be allocated within Canada, whether the exist-
ing allocation by the federal government was illegal, and 
whether Nunavut halibut fisheries should have greater pri-
ority in that allocation. In the 1990s, the Minister of Fisher-
ies and Oceans Canada allocated the total allowable catch of 
halibut both within and outside Nunavut. Nunavut Tunnga-
vik Incorporated, the corporation representing the Inuit 
beneficiaries under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, 
protested through litigation, claiming this allocation was 
inconsistent with the constitutionally protected Agreement. 
Article 15.3.7 of the Agreement recognizes the impor-
tance of adjacency and the economic dependence of com-
munities in the Nunavut Settlement Area on marine 
resources, obliges the government to give special consid-
eration to these factors when allocating commercial fishing 
licences, and stipulates that the principles of adjacency and 
economic dependence will be applied in such a way as to 
promote a fair distribution of licences between territorial 
residents and residents of other parts of Canada that is con-
sistent with Canada’s inter-jurisdictional obligations.
In 2002, the Independent Panel on Access Criteria 
appointed by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
issued a report on the criteria used for granting licences in 
new or emerging fisheries. Because Nunavut did not enjoy 
the same access to its adjacent fisheries that is granted to 
the Atlantic provinces, the panel concluded that every effort 
should be made to remedy this situation. In keeping with the 
spirit of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, and the fair 
and consistent application of the adjacency principle, the 
panel recommended that no additional access be granted to 
non-Nunavut interests in adjacent waters until Nunavut had 
a major share of adjacent fishery resources. This recom-
mendation was accepted by the Minister of Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada (DFO, 2002).
This ended an allocation for the Greenlandic halibut that 
was illegal under Canadian law, as all laws are invalid to 
the extent that they are inconsistent with a constitutionally 
protected land-claim agreement. Since that time, Nunavut 
fisheries have been receiving a larger share of the halibut 
quota allocation, and parties based in Nunavut are partici-
pating in commercial halibut fishing in these waters. Four 
organizations with local Inuit involvement now hold 100% 
of Nunavut’s Greenlandic halibut and shrimp quota (DFO, 
2009). The territorial government has developed a policy 
for allocating quotas to Nunavut’s existing commercial 
marine fisheries, and it is also conducting scientific research 
to determine the nature and scope of possible commercial 
fisheries for species such as char, clams, and sea urchins 
(Nunavut Department of Environment, 2010). Sound scien-
tific research is critical to the sustainable development and 
management of inshore and offshore fisheries. 
The Irminger Sea Redfish Fishery
The Irminger Sea redfish (Sebastes mentella) stock is 
found near the Reykjanes Ridge in the North Atlantic, adja-
cent to the Icelandic Exclusive Economic Zone (Fig. 3). 
Redfish is a straddling fish stock under the North East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) that is subject to 
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FIG. 2. Map showing the location of NAFO Convention sub- 
area 0. Courtesy of NAFO.
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illegal fishing in the Irminger Sea by ships flying flags of 
convenience. These ships are registered in countries that 
are not members of the NEAFC Convention and do not 
have an allocation, and they are fishing illegally (Green-
peace, 2006).
These illegal fishing ships are being monitored through 
surveillance activities by Iceland and other parties, and 
they are not permitted to enter Icelandic ports. Information 
garnered through the surveillance activities is also used in 
regional anti-IUU co-operation under the North East Atlan-
tic Fisheries Convention of 1959, as substantially amended 
by the Convention on future multilateral cooperation in 
North East Atlantic fisheries of 1982. Iceland also under-
takes bilateral action with the ship’s flag state, the state 
where the ship’s operator is located, the state where the 
ship’s underlying ownership is held, and the state where the 
company that sells the fish is registered (Hoydal, 2009). 
The Irminger Sea redfish that is being harvested illegally 
near the Reykjanes Ridge may be transported to China and 
processed there and then resold in Canada. The question 
arises how consumers and governments can ensure that red-
fish imports do not contribute to IUU fishing in the Arctic. 
In addition to regulation under regional organizations and 
conventions, consumer actions could be useful. Consumer 
action could include uniform labeling requirements or sus-
tainable fishery certifications. 
The existing IUU fishery regime for Antarctica and the 
one recently enacted IUU fishery regime in Europe are 
now explored in order to consider whether aspects of these 
regimes could also be effective at addressing IUU fisheries 
in the circumpolar Arctic.
ANTARcTIcA ANd EuROPEAN
Iuu FIShINg REgIMES
CCAMLR and IUU Fisheries
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) came into force in 1982 
under Article IX of the Antarctica Treaty of 1959. The Con-
vention was established because of concern that increased 
krill catches in the Southern Ocean could negatively affect 
the krill population and the birds, seals, and fish that depend 
on krill for food. The aim of the Convention is to conserve 
marine life of the Southern Ocean. Conservation measures 
are based on scientific advice and require enforcement to be 
effective. A precautionary approach has been implemented 
to minimize risk associated with unsustainable practices 
in conditions of uncertainty, and it is complemented by an 
ecosystem approach (CCAMLR, 2008). 
IUU fishing is a significant issue in the Convention area 
and adjacent waters. CCAMLR estimates of IUU fishing 
exceed allowable catches under the Convention. These ille-
gal catches have been taken in national waters within the 
Convention Area or in a manner different from or contrary 
to management measures aimed at controlling and monitor-
ing unregulated and unreported catches. 
CCAMLR introduced catch documentation schemes in 
2000 to monitor landings of and global trade in the Patago-
nia toothfish or Chilean sea bass (Dissostichus eleginoides) 
in order to assess and combat IUU fishing for this species. 
This documentation enables the Commission established 
under the Convention to identify the origin of fish entering 
the markets of all parties and helps to determine whether 
the fish were caught in a manner consistent with conserva-
tion measures.
Other CCAMLR conservation measures include strict 
vessel licensing requirements, at-sea and in-port vessel 
inspections, and the requirement for the continuous mon-
itoring of vessel positions in the Convention area using 
automated satellite-linked monitoring systems. For some 
fisheries, flag states are required to transmit real-time ves-
sel position information to a central database. CCAMLR 
also conducts annual reviews of information on IUU fishing 
activities and has established a list of IUU vessels. Together, 
these initiatives have contributed to a significant decline in 
IUU fishing since 2003 (CCAMLR, 2010). 
European Union IUU Regulations
The definition of IUU fishing in the European Union 
(EU) IUU Regulations of 2008 to 2010 was based on an ear-
lier FAO International Plan of Action of 2001 (FAO, 2001). 
The new EU regulations are intended to prevent, deter, and 
eliminate IUU fishing and focus on both EU fishers and EU 
consumers. The IUU Regulations apply to 1) fishing occur-
ring in European Community waters; 2) fishing in Exclu-
sive Economic Zones and international waters that are 
subject to a regional fishery management organization, if 
FIG. 3. Map of the NEAFC Regulatory Area, showing the 
Reykanes Ridge and Irminger Sea (NEAFC, 2010).
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conducted by ships without a flag state or from a flag state 
that is not party to the regional agreement or by any ship 
that contravenes the rules of the organizations; and 3) fish-
ing in international waters that occurs in breach of flag state 
responsibilities under international law for the conservation 
of fisheries (European Commission, 2010).
Through the IUU Regulations that came into effect on 1 
January 2010, the European Union (2008, 2009, 2010a, b) 
is preventing illegal operators from selling fish in Europe. 
The IUU Regulations prevent fish caught from illicit activi-
ties from entering the European market because all marine 
fishery products must be certified and their origin must 
be traceable. A comprehensive catch certification scheme 
makes sure that fish caught, landed, brought to market, and 
sold in Europe can be tracked at any stage of the process. 
Now only marine fishery products validated as legal by the 
relevant flag state or exporting state can be imported to or 
exported from the European Union (European Commis-
sion, 2009). 
A European black list has been drawn up covering both 
IUU ships and states that permit illegal fishing activities. 
European operators who fish illegally anywhere in the 
world, under any flag, face substantial penalties propor-
tionate to the economic value of their catch, which would 
deprive them of any profit. Modern technologies are used to 
track fish products through every step of the market chain. 
The same offence will be subject to the same sanction wher-
ever it takes place and whatever the fisherman’s nationality 
or flag. There is also a point system for serious infringe-
ments, which can ultimately result in wrongdoers’ losing 
their licence to fish (European Union, 2010a, b).
SuMMARy
Potential illegal, unreported, and unregulated fisher-
ies in the circumpolar Arctic could take several forms. As 
discussed earlier, these problematic fisheries might arise 
through international boundary disputes, internal conflicts, 
or inappropriate fishing in national and international waters. 
The IUU fishing regimes for Antarctica and Europe provide 
models for addressing such fisheries in the circumpolar 
Arctic. The Antarctic model under CCAMLR, which is the 
most longstanding approach to IUU fisheries, reflects the 
overlapping international claims in the Southern Ocean and 
the importance of that ocean for fishing. The EU approach 
is similar to CCAMLR, but also includes restrictions on 
consumption of IUU fish within European and national 
markets. 
In the Arctic, there are eight circumpolar nations with 
existing Exclusive Economic Zones. The future continental 
shelf extensions under UNCLOS, if approved, will extend to 
most of the Arctic Ocean, and provide significant resource 
use and management rights to these nations for the seabed 
and overlying waters. These Arctic nations, which include 
Canada and the United States, the Scandinavian countries, 
and Russia, are also major importers and consumers of fish. 
Therefore it might be useful to include a consideration of 
the consumption of IUU fish in their national approaches. 
Both the Antarctic and EU models for IUU fisheries 
can provide good examples for circum-Arctic approaches. 
Combined with efforts of regional fishing organizations and 
conventions and consumer awareness of sustainable fish-
ery certifications, these Arctic approaches could help to 
minimize the risks of future IUU fisheries. As fish stocks 
move northward, and commercial fisheries develop, these 
national and regional approaches could also be formalized 
in a broader regional agreement for fisheries in the Arctic 
Ocean.
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